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1 Introduction
One of the most challenging tasks for contemporary macroeconomics is the construction
of robust empirical tests of the explanatory power of alternative theories of unemploy-
ment. Recent contributions by Nickell (1997), Elmeskov et al. (1998), Belot and van
Ours (2000), Blanchard and Wolfers (2000) and Bertola et al. (2001) have shed some
light on the causal relationship that links institutional factors and macroeconomic shocks
with the rise and the persistence of high unemployment levels in most of the OECD
countries. However we still lack of an empirical account of the way labour market in-
stitutions aﬀect unemployment levels through their impact on wage determination. As
we will see below, an important part of the explanation of the impact of labour market
institutions on unemployment can be derived by the role played by these institutions in
the wage determination process. If institutions do matter in the explanation of OECD
unemployment patterns, then we should be able to estimate a signiﬁcant impact on wages
as well. Moreover, even if some institutions do not aﬀect unemployment directly, exerting
pressure on wages, but through their impact on the matching process of the unemployed
to available job vacancies, they should have a signiﬁcant impact on wages as well through
the movements in equilibrium labour demand. The unemployment and the wage models
are intimately connected and should yield coherent results.
This work and the companion paper Nickell et al. (2001) propose an empirical inves-
tigation of the combined eﬀects of wage pressure factors and labour market institutions
on unemployment rates and labour cost. Our aim is to produce an empirical investiga-
tion of the time series properties of OECD unemployment and to yield some insight on
the far from homogeneous experience of each single country. This paper concentrates on
labour cost determination in OECD countries, while Nickell et al. present a broader pic-
ture, including an account of unemployment patterns and the Beveridge Curve in those
countries.
The structure of the paper is the following: the next section contains a concise the-
oretical introduction, section three presents a model of labour cost determination and a
brief description of what we intend for labour market institutions. Section four includes
a brief overview of the existing multi-country models of labour cost determination. Sec-
tions ﬁve, six and seven present the empirical analysis, including some comments on the
speciﬁcation of the econometric model. Section eight contains some ﬁnal remarks1.
2 Unemployment and Labour Cost Determination
Our theoretical background is Nickell (1998). According to his simple model, the wage
setting framework is described by the equation:
w = θ1p
e + (1− θ1) p− θ2u− θ3∆u+ zw (1)
where wages are assumed to be set as a mark-up on averaged actual and expected
prices, and zw indicates the vector of all exogenous wage pressure factors. The extent of
1Note that in what follows we use indiﬀerently the term wage and labour cost, intending the real
product wage (labour costs per employee normalised on the output price). This includes non wage costs
such as employers’ contributions.
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the mark up is inﬂuenced by the state of the labour market, represented by the unem-
ployment rate u (here in logs) and the growth rate of unemployment ∆u.
Assuming mark-up price setting behaviour for ﬁrms, a standard production function
and a mix of anticipated and unanticipated shocks on demand, price, and wages, this
stylized model yields the following reduced unemployment equation:
u = φ1u−1 + φ2 (z¯p + z¯w)− φ2 (n + λr) + φ3 (p + w) (2)
where (z¯w, z¯p) represent anticipated autonomous shifts in wages and prices respec-
tively, (w, p) are unanticipated shifts in the same variables, and (n, r) are unanticipated
nominal and real demand shocks. In addition, we have that φ1 = θ3/θ and φ2 = θ
−1, with
θ = (θ2 + θ3). The assumption of rational expectations rules out any eﬀect of anticipated
demand shocks on unemployment.
A few points can be drawn from this simple setting:
• There exists a negative long run relationship between unemployment and real de-
mand factors. This relationship is the obvious consequence of whichever speciﬁ-
cation we may assume for the production function, since labour is a fundamental
input for production.
• The relationship between unemployment and wage and price pressure factors (z¯w, z¯p)
depends on the impact of unemployment on wages, i.e. on the coeﬃcient θ2.
(i) If the unemployment level does not aﬀect wages, i.e. if θ2 = 0, then φ1 = 1 and
according to equation (2) unemployment will follow a random walk process.
In this case its actual level will depend on the history of past shocks, and any
unemployment level will be compatible with stable inﬂation.
(ii) If unemployment signiﬁcantly aﬀects wages, i.e. if θ2 > 0, then the eﬀect of
past shocks falls with time at a rate which increases with θ2. Most impor-
tantly, there exists a level of unemployment u∗ = 1
θ
2
(z¯w + z¯p) such that if
unemployment is consistently lower than u∗ there is a tendency for inﬂation to
grow. The unemployment level u∗ is determined by wage and price pressure
factors (z¯w, z¯p).
The intuition underlying last point is that autonomous changes in unemployment
could be oﬀset by labour market forces if higher unemployment triggers a reduction in
wages. If this is the case, unemployment will depend on wage pressure institutions. If
this is not the case, we expect unemployment to be fully persistent (i.e. it will follow an
I(1) process).
The analysis of equation (1) is therefore a crucial step in order to understand the
sources of OECD unemployment. Consequently, the objectives of the paper are the
following:
1. to analyse the impact of unemployment on wages;
2. to investigate the impact of labour market institutions on wages;
3. to investigate the coherence of the wage model with the analogous model of unem-
ployment contained in the companion paper Nickell et al. (2001).
3
This paper concentrates on the estimation of a labour cost equation while Nickell et
al. (2001) provides an extensive account of the unemployment model based on the same
criteria. The theoretical and empirical relationships between the two analysis have been
brieﬂy discussed here. A broader discussion can be found in the companion paper.
3 A Model of Labour Cost Determination
Equation (1) may be written as:
w − p = −θ2u− θ3∆u+ zw − θ1 (p− p
e) (3)
where the term θ1 (p− p
e) reﬂects macro shocks.
If we want to generalise this simple model we have to allow wages to be ceteribus
paribus anchored to productivity in equilibrium. In addition, there are empirical and
theoretical reasons to expect some form of persistence in wage dynamics2. A general
dynamic reduced form, allowing for a positive productivity trend π and endogenous per-
sistence, is therefore:
wt − pt = β0 + β1 (wt−1 − pt−1)− β2ut − β3∆ut + β4πt + γ
′z¯w,t + ϑ
′st (4)
where the same notation used above applies here, with z¯w being the vector of wage
pressure factors,and s a vector of nominal and real shocks.
According to equation (4) the log real wage level depends respectively on last period’s
value, labour market conditions represented by the level and change in unemployment, i.e.
ut and ∆ut, the productivity trend πt, wage pressure factors z¯w, and a set of macro shocks
st. Given the peculiar nature of our sample period, starting in 1960 when unemployment
was virtually zero in some countries, in what follows we do not impose unemployment to
be in logs3, since we would introduce spurious variability in the series4.
The vector of wage pressure factors z¯w includes the set of all labour market institutions
that inﬂuence the matching process of unemployed individuals to available job vacancies,
or directly raise wages in presence of excess labour supply, or both. In any case they
will impact wages and unemployment in the same direction, since labour demand, which
is negatively related to wages, will move in the opposite direction of unemployment in
equilibrium.
The institutions can be broadly classiﬁed into wage bargaining institutions, institu-
tions related to unemployment beneﬁt provision, employment protection regulations and
labour taxation. The empirical counterpart of each institutional dimension is represented
by an indicator provided by the Labour Market Institutions Database (LMID), assem-
2This can depend on various factors, the most obvious being a certain degree of persistence of the
impact of macro shocks. Moreover, in the presence of staggered wage adjustment in most countries, only
a fraction of total contracts will be renewed every period, with the a resulting strong autocorrelation in
the average wage.
3For example, Germany, New Zealand and Switzerland.
4For example, in log form, the rise in unemployment in Switzerland from 1960-64 to 1996-99 (0.2%
to 3.7%) has a negative impact on wages which is nearly 300 percent larger than that in Italy where
unemployment rose from 3.5% to 10%. This diﬀerential seems somewhat implausible.
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bled by Nickell and Nunziata from diﬀerent sources, and extensively described in the data
appendix of this paper5.
The institutions having a direct impact on the wage determination process are the
trade union bargaining power and the degree of coordination in wage bargaining.
The latter represents the extent to which parties to wage bargaining are able to take
account of the macroeconomic consequences of their decisions. Union power consists
instead of two major dimensions that are the proportion of employees covered by collective
agreements (union coverage) and the union membership rate among active workers (union
density). Unfortunately, we can only estimate the wage impact of union density since the
data on union coverage is available for a very limited number of years6. As suggested
by previous analysis, we expect a positive impact of union bargaining power on wages,
although the eﬀect is likely to be oﬀset if bargaining is highly coordinated7.
As regards unemployment beneﬁts, a generous system has a direct negative inﬂu-
ence on the willingness of the unemployed to undertake a vacant job. Both the amount
and the time duration of the monetary transfer to unemployed individuals may matter in
this respect. The former is summarised by the beneﬁt replacement rate, i.e. the ratio of
the average unemployment beneﬁt on the average salary, aggregated over family types8.
The attitude of the unemployed can also be inﬂuenced by the returns on non human
wealth which may be increasing in the real interest rate9.
Employment protection regulations are by deﬁnition the set of rules and procedures
governing the treatment of dismissals of employed workers. Much of the economic liter-
ature insists on the negative impact of these regulations on the employment dynamics10.
In addition, they raise the bargaining power of insiders, inducing an upward pressure on
bargained wages. However, it is not clear if these regulations exert an eﬀect as signiﬁcant
on the employment level (and therefore on unemployment) in equilibrium. A series of
conﬂicting eﬀects are involved here: inﬂows into unemployment are reduced by higher
protection, while the eﬀect on outﬂows from unemployment is unclear. Firms may be
more cautious about hiring new staﬀ, but the quality of the personnel may be improved
by a reduction in the trial-and-error recruitment procedures11.
Finally, by labour taxation we mean the tax wedge between the real product wage
paid by the employer and the real consumption wage received by the employee12. This
consists of the sum of the payroll tax rate, the income tax rate and the consumption tax
rate. The question here is how much part of the increase in the tax wedge is born by the
5See also Nickell and Nunziata (2001), the description in Nunziata (2001) and the general discussion
in Nickell et al. (2001). A general survey on labour market institutions is provided by Nickell and Layard
(1999) while some previous discussions can be found in Layard et al.(1991), Bean (1994) and Nickell
(1997).
6See Nickell et al. (2001) for a summary picture of the OECD union coverage patterns.
7See Nickell and Layard (1999) and Boeri et al. (2001).
8No long and comprehensive series on the coverage or on the strictness of the beneﬁt provision system
are available for all the countries. Nevertheless, these factors may be of a certain importance in explaining
the experience of countries with generous beneﬁts. It is the case of Denmark, where, according to the
Ministry of Labour, the implementation of a tighter enforcement system in the 1990s was one of the
main causes behind the large reduction in unemployment unaccompanied by any inﬂationary pressure
(see Danish Ministry of Finance, 1999, Chapter 2).
9See Phelps (1994) for a broader discussion.
10See, for example, Bentolila and Bertola (1990), Nickell and Nunziata (2000) and Nunziata (2001).
11See Daniel and Stilgoe (1978) and Evans et al. (1985) for a discussion on the UK.
12The former is normalised on the GDP deﬂator, while the latter uses the consumer price index.
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employers or shifted to the employees through a reduction in the after-tax consumption
wage. In the ﬁrst case both wages and unemployment increase, while in the second
case labour costs and unemployment are unaﬀected. The extent to which wages and
unemployment respond to changes in the tax wedge tells us which direction prevails. A
similar real wage resistance eﬀect can be generated by an adverse shift in the terms of
trade or by an unexpected fall in trend productivity growth.
4 Some Previous Multi-Country Models
Most of the existing empirical cross country literature on labour cost determination con-
centrates on the eﬀects of taxation on wages. This is found to be shaped by the institu-
tional conﬁguration of the labour market, however this is deﬁned13.
Newell and Symons (1985) use marginal tax data in a simple cross country regression
setting, ﬁnding a signiﬁcant negative correlation between marginal tax rates and technical
progress, real product wages, investment and labour force participation, and a positive
correlation with the unemployment rate. The econometric analysis however is not robust,
since the authors do not control for country eﬀects.
Alesina and Perotti (1997) propose a more sophisticated panel analysis of 14 OECD
countries, for the period 1965 to 199014. They regress unit labour costs on labour tax,
a centralization in wage bargaining dummy, total factor productivity and some other
controls. The countries are divided into three groups according to their degree of cen-
tralization in wage bargaining, and the labour tax variable is interacted with the relative
three indicator variables. The empirical evidence produced by the authors supports the
view that an increase in labour taxation induces a labour cost increase in countries with
an intermediate degree of bargaining centralization15. According to the authors, this re-
sult suggests that the relationship between taxation and wages is hump shaped. In other
words, highly decentralized countries are characterized by lower distortions while if bar-
gaining is highly centralized then unions internalize the welfare improvements associated
with higher tax pressure, demanding lower pay increases16.
However, given that all the variables included in the regressions are in log diﬀerence the
model implies that a 10 percent rise in taxes from the average value in 1960-1990 induces
a somewhat implausible 27 percent increase in unit labour costs in the intermediate
countries. In addition consumption taxes are omitted from the labour tax variable, which
is deﬁned as the sum of direct taxes paid by households, social security taxes paid by
employers and employees and payroll taxes as shares of GDP. This omission should be
tested, since we should expect that a switch from income taxation to consumption taxation
13The empirical literature on wage determination is immense. A number of other relevant contributions
are not mentioned here because of the diﬀerent emphasis or methodology. See, for example, the macroe-
conomic papers of Alogoskouﬁs and Manning (1988) and Bean et al. (1986), as well as the literature on
wage curves originated by Blanchﬂower and Oswald (1990, 1994) that concentrates especially on micro
data.
14The countries in the sample are Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany,
Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, United Kingdom and United States. The base equations
include country and year eﬀects.
15The countries belonging to the intermediate bargaining centralization group are Germany, Nether-
lands and Belgium.
16See Calmfors and Driﬃll (1988) and Freeman (1988) for evidence.
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would not change wage earners real income17. Moreover, the authors’ assumption implies,
quite implausibly, that by simply replacing payroll and income taxes by consumption
taxes, we can reduce labour costs by a huge amount, thereby generating a huge reduction
in unemployment.
The main concern about the model is however that labour market institutions are
taken into account simply dividing the countries into three groups, on the basis of one
dimension only, namely bargaining centralization. In fact, several other features of labour
market institutions are likely to be crucial in a model of labour cost. This approach also
fails to consider the historical evolution of the characteristics of the bargaining process
in each country. The changes can be relevant for some countries and could aﬀect the
country classiﬁcation proposed by the authors. As an example, looking at the time series
for coordination used in this paper, we see a 25 percent fall in coordination for Sweden
from 1980 to 1995 and a 66 percent raise in Italy from 1990 to 1995.
Daveri and Tabellini (2000) follow a similar approach in a study of the eﬀects of
taxation on unemployment and growth on a group of 14 OECD countries18. The claim of
the paper is that higher taxation is correlated with greater labour costs and therefore with
higher unemployment and a lower rate of growth. Although the theoretical arguments
of the authors are in some way diﬀerent from Alesina and Perotti, the conclusions are
comparable. The analysis is constructed using ﬁve years averaged data in order to remove
cyclical ﬂuctuations, and the tax data is constructed using the methodology suggested by
Mendoza, Razin and Tesar (1994). The countries are divided into three groups according
to the characteristics of their bargaining system, where the composition of each group is
diﬀerent from the one adopted by Alesina and Perotti, possibly because the authors do
not consider only centralization as a subdivision criteria, but other bargaining dimensions
too19. The estimation results indicate that taxation has a positive signiﬁcant impact on
unemployment in the countries belonging to the intermediate group, namely continental
Europe plus Australia. There is also a positive eﬀect for Canada, US, Japan and Thatcher
UK, but weaker. Regarding labour costs, the authors estimate two alternative models,
using respectively data on the growth rate of gross real earnings in manufacturing, and
the growth rate of net real wages of the average manufacturing worker. The reported
2SLS coeﬃcients in the ﬁrst more robust case indicate that higher taxation is correlated
with higher labour costs in continental Europe and Australia, so that a unit change in
the average tax is translated into a 0.49 percent increase of gross real wage.
Being the methodology used by Daveri and Tabellini quite similar to the one adopted
by Alesina and Perotti, similar comments apply here. In this case too, the tax data does
not include consumption taxation, and the unemployment regressions are quite bald,
with very few regressors. In addition, the composition of each country group, according
to the institutional framework governing wage bargaining, suﬀers from a certain degree of
subjectivity. Indeed, the choice of including one country in one group instead of another
ultimately responds to the criteria implied by the authors. Even if we were to rule out
subjectivity, there seems to be no reason why we should stick to one rule only. The
subdivision criteria can be various and contradictory, with a likely relevant impact on the
estimation results.
17See Nickell and Layard (1999).
18With respect to Alesina and Perotti, they include Spain in the sample and exclude Danemark.
19These are union density, union coverage and coordination.
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Our model intends to respond to these problems and limitations. In what follows
we provide an empirical test of the impact of institutions on labour cost determination
in OECD countries, together with an investigation of the role played by labour market
forces.
5 The Econometric Model
We estimate a general version of equation (4) on a sample of 20 OECD countries observed
from 1960 to 1994. The baseline speciﬁcation of the empirical model is the following:
wit−pit = β0+β1wit−1−β2Uit−β3∆Uit+β4πit+γ
′z¯w,it+λ
′hit+ϑ
′sit+φiti+µi+λt+εit
(5)
where the same notation used above applies here with wit − pit being the real unit
labour cost (i.e. real unit wages, salaries and social security contributions paid by resident
producers), U the unemployment rate (that we do not impose to be in logs), ∆U the
diﬀerence in the unemployment rate, π the productivity trend, z¯w a vector of labour
market institutions, h a vector of interactions among institutions and other regressors,
s a vector of macroeconomic shocks, ti a country speciﬁc time trend, µi a ﬁxed country
eﬀect, vt a year dummy and εit the stochastic residual
20.
More speciﬁcally, the vector of labour institutions includes:
γ′z¯w,it = γ1EPit + γ2BRRit + γ3∆UDit + γ4COit + γ5TWit (6)
where EPit is employment protection, BRRit is the unemployment beneﬁt replace-
ment rate, UDit is net union density, COit is bargaining coordination and TWit is the
tax wedge, i.e. direct + indirect + payroll tax rate.
The vector of interactions in the baseline model has the following form:
λ′hit = λ1URCO + λ2URBRRit + λ3URUDit + λ4TWCOit (7)
where each element, denoted with obvious notation, is expressed as interaction between
deviations from the world average ξ¯, i.e. :
V arXV arYit =
{
V arXit − ξ¯V arX
}
·
{
V arYit − ξ¯V arY
}
. (8)
Expressing the interactions in this way allows us to read the coeﬃcient of each insti-
tution in levels as the coeﬃcient of the ”average” country, i.e. of the hypothetical country
characterized by the average level of that speciﬁc institutional indicator.
The vector of controls for macroeconomic shocks contains the following elements:
ϑ′sit = ϑ1D2TFPit + ϑ2TTSFCit (9)
where D2TFP is a total factor productivity shock, calculated as the acceleration in
productivity, ∆2TFP , and TTSFC is a terms of trade shock21.
20See the appendix for data deﬁnitions and sources.
21This is calculated as
(
imports
GDP
)
∆log
(
P
import
P
GDP
)
where Pimport is the imports deﬂator and PGDP is
the GDP deﬂator at factor cost.
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RZB Test RZB Test
Small sample approximation
Interactions Test
Statistic χ2(171) = 99.76 F(171,392) = 94.86 χ
2
(126) = 525.01
P-value 0.99 0.00 0.00
Regressors Institutions and shocks Institutions and shocks Institutions and shocks
Table 1: Poolability Tests
We adopt a GLS ﬁxed eﬀect estimator, in order to control for country unobservables
and to correct for heteroskedasticity across countries as well as residual serial corre-
lation22. The time dummies capture instead the contemporaneous correlations across
countries. Next section introduces some speciﬁcation and diagnostic tests that justify
the adoption of a GLS ﬁxed eﬀect estimator, discussing the implications and potential
problems of this choice. The following sections present the estimations results and some
dynamic simulations of the baseline model.
6 Specification and Diagnostic Tests
6.1 Poolability of the data
When estimating a multi-country equation like in our case, the hypothesis of homogeneous
coeﬃcients has to be tested. This is especially relevant in a dynamic setting since, under
the assumption of a random coeﬃcient model23, if parameter heterogeneity is ignored,
the pooled estimator is inconsistent even when T →∞, as shown by Pesaran and Smith
(1995). We perform the poolability test suggested by Roy (1957), Zellner (1962) and
Baltagi (1995) (RZB test) that requires the estimation of the model under the restriction
of common slopes across countries, as well as allowing heterogeneous slopes. This test
is a generalization of the Chow test for the N linear regressions case, under the general
assumption of non spherical disturbances ε  N (0,Ω).
Table 1 shows the test statistics for the baseline version of the model, without intro-
ducing interactions among institutions. The null hypothesis of poolability is not rejected
as shown in the ﬁrst column of the table. However, this result is not conﬁrmed if we
consider the small sample approximation of the distribution of the test, as in column two
of the same table.
The tests in column one and two are calculated using a simpliﬁed version of the
baseline model24. The need for this simpliﬁcation comes from the fact that it is not
possible to estimate country speciﬁc coeﬃcients for some of the regressors. For example,
the coordination variable is constant for some countries over the whole sample period
22Note that the Balestra-Nerlove random eﬀect speciﬁcation was always rejected by a standard Haus-
man test.
23By RCM it is intended a model such that given the panel speciﬁcation yit = λiyi,t−1 + β
′
ixit + εit,
i = 1, 2, . . . ,N , t = 1, 2, . . . , T , the individual coeﬃcients are distributed around a common mean. i.e.
λi = λ+ η1i and βi = β+ η2i, with stochastic components having zero means and constant covariances.
24This includes labour cost (lagged), unemployment rate, beneﬁt replacement ratio, ∆ union density,
tax wedge, total factor productivity shock, term of trade shock and productivity trend.
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and we cannot estimate its coeﬃcient in each by country regression25. This limitation
can be eliminated by calculating an alternative poolability test introducing interactions
between the regressors and the country dummies and testing for the joint signiﬁcance of
the interactions. The third column of Table 1 presents the test statistic computed for the
baseline labour cost model. Here again the poolability null is rejected.
These tests limit the scope of investigation to the validity of the null hypothesis of
homogeneous coeﬃcients for all countries. However, as suggested by Baltagi (1995), the
pooled model can yield more eﬃcient estimates at the expenses of bias. McElroy (1977)
suggests three tests based on weaker mean square errors (MSE) criteria that do not test
the falsity of the poolability hypothesis but allow to choose between the constrained and
unconstrained estimator on a pragmatic basis, i.e. on the basis of the trade-oﬀ between
bias and eﬃciency.
Under the general assumption of ε  N (0,Ω), being gˆ∗GLS the constrained estimator
and δˆ
∗
GLS the unconstrained estimator, the null hypothesis of the MSE based tests is that
gˆ∗GLS is better than δˆ
∗
GLS on ”pragmatic grounds”. Table 2 presents the test statistics
calculated for the same model of Table 1 as well as the analytical expression for the null
hypothesis. According to the Strong MSE criteria, the pooled estimator is preferable to
the unconstrained estimator if λNT ≤
1
2 , with λNT being the non centrality parameter
of the test. The ﬁrst and second Weak MSE tests are constructed such that the pooled
estimator is preferable to the unconstrained if the conditions in the last two columns of the
table are met. These conditions imply that the unconstrained estimator is characterized
by a mean square error which is higher than in the constrained estimator case26.
These tests suggest that under the second weak MSE criterion the pooled estima-
tor is better than the unconstrained estimator on our data. In other words the pooled
model yields more eﬃcient estimates than the by country regressions. Although this
result gives us some conﬁdence in pursuing a pooled approach, it is not robust enough
to justify a pure coeﬃcient homogeneity framework. Therefore we introduce a set of in-
teractions among institutions and unemployment that allow some institution coeﬃcients
to vary across countries and over time. In this way we are also able to control for the
institutional complementarity eﬀects suggested by the theory. Our model is therefore
semi-pooled in the sense that the institutional coeﬃcients are free to vary across countries
and over time, according to the restrictions imposed by the homogeneous coeﬃcients of
each interaction. In this respect, in measuring the eﬀects of institutions, we balance the
eﬃciency gains obtained using a pooled empirical approach, with the need to avoid the
likely bias produced by a pure homogeneous model27.
25In addition, in the case of New Zealand it is not possible to estimate a complete model since the
number of the coeﬃcients is higher than the available observations. This is due to missing observations
for the tax wedge in New Zealand before 1975 and after 1986.
26Note that in this particular case, the strong MSE and the ﬁrst weak test almost coincide, being
φNT = 0.57.
27This approach has also the advantage of simplicity as well as of ﬂexibility, as opposed to more sophis-
ticated methods such as Pesaran and Smith’s pooled mean group (PMG) estimator. Indeed, although
allowing short run coeﬃcients to vary across countries, the PMG approach imposes long run coeﬃcients
to be the same across countries and time. This is a restriction that we do not need to impose when we
treat heterogeneity through interactions.
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”Strong MSE” Test ”First Weak” MSE Test ”Second Weak” MSE Test
Statistic λNT = 78.05 λNT = 78.05 λNT = 78.05
H0 : λNT ≤
1
2 λNT ≤ φNT = 0.57 λNT ≤ (N − 1)K
′/2 = 85.5
Pooling is better no no yes
Table 2: MSE Poolability Tests
Baseline model
GH test χ2(19) = 4592.66
P-value 0.00
Table 3: Test for groupwise heteroskedasticity
6.2 Nickell Bias in Dynamic Fixed Eﬀect Models
Nickell (1981) shows that in the AR(1) case the bias of a dynamic ﬁxed eﬀect model
is O (1/T ) and therefore becomes less important as T grows. Judson and Owen (1999)
test the performance of the ﬁxed eﬀect estimator by means of Monte Carlo simulations,
concentrating on panels with typical macroeconomic dimensions, i.e. small N and T ,
with N  T . Their analysis suggests that the ﬁxed eﬀect estimator performs as well as
or better than many alternatives when T = 30, i.e. with a T dimension similar to ours.
6.3 Heteroskedasticity
The ﬁxed eﬀect speciﬁcation assumes homoskedasticity. In other words, given a two
way error component model as in our case, with uit = µi + λt + εit , εit is assumed
homoskedastic. If the assumption is not met, then the estimates will still be consistent
but ineﬃcient. A groupwise likelihood ratio heteroskedasticity test was performed on the
residuals of the baseline model estimated by OLS. The test is chi-squared distributed
with G − 1 degrees of freedom, where G is the number of groups in the sample, 20
countries in our case. Table 3 shows the results of the test, according to which we reject
the null hypothesis of homoskedasticity across groups. This suggests the adoption of a
feasible ﬁxed eﬀect GLS estimator, with a variance covariance matrix that incorporates
heteroskedasticity across countries.
6.4 Residuals Serial Correlation
Baltagi and Li (1995) suggest an LM test for serial correlation in ﬁxed eﬀects models.
The two versions of the test, presented in Table 4, are calculated assuming two alter-
native speciﬁcations for the error autocorrelation structure, namely AR (1) and MA (1).
The asymptotic distribution of the test statistics is calculated for T large. Under both
assumptions, the null hypothesis of no serial correlation in the disturbances is rejected.
Given the results of the heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation tests, the feasible GLS
estimator in this paper is constructed assuming by country groupwise heteroskedasticity
and an AR(1) structure in the disturbances εit.
11
Baseline model
LM test, AR (1)
εit = ρεi,t−1 + υit
H0 : ρ = 0
χ2(1) = 31.51
P-value0.000
LM5 test, MA (1)
εit = υit + λυi,t−1
H0 : λ = 0
N(0, 1) = 5.61
P-value0.000
Table 4: Tests for serial correlation
6.5 Overconﬁdence in GLS Pooled Models
The adoption of a pooled feasible GLS approach is not exempt from potential problems.
Beck and Katz (1995) argue that the application of feasible GLS to time-series cross-
sectional data can lead to underestimating the coeﬃcients’ standard errors. This is due
to the large number of parameters that need to be estimated when modelling the variance
covariance matrix Ωˆ. The matrix Ωˆ should account in principle for country heteroskedas-
ticity, by country autocorrelation as well as contemporaneous correlation across countries.
The main problem is generated by the need to estimate the N × (N +1)/2 time invariant
contemporaneous covariances across countries using NT observations. This requires a
time dimension T considerably larger than N since the downward bias in the standard
errors is larger the closer to zero is NT −N × (N + 1)/2. However, in our case this con-
dition is not needed, since we model contemporaneous cross country correlations through
the inclusion of time dummies. This results in a variance covariance matrix Ωˆ with only
N × 2 parameters, represented by N variances and N autocorrelations28.
6.6 Unit Roots and Panel Cointegration
We check for unit roots in each country series using an augmented Dickey Fuller test with
trend that is valid in presence of serial correlation of unknown form29. The results of the
tests are shown in Table 5. As we can see there is a clear evidence of non stationarity for
many of the variables. In particular the standardized unemployment rate, employment
protection, the beneﬁt replacement ratio, beneﬁt duration, union density, coordination
and the tax wedge are non stationary in each country. We therefore need to test for
cointegration, and one simple way of doing this is to test for unit roots in the residuals
of the static version of the baseline model. There are several residual based panel data
cointegration tests available in the literature. Levin and Lin (1993) suggest a supercon-
sistent unit root test with limiting normal distribution. Im et al. (1996) propose a more
general test, allowing parameter heterogeneity in the testing regressions but implicitly
requiring a balanced panel for the test to be valid. Given the unbalanced nature of our
data, we use the test suggested by Maddala and Wu (1996) using previous ﬁndings by
28A further possible simpliﬁcation is the restriction of a common autoregressive parameter across
countries that reduces the number of parameters of Ωˆ to N . Imposing this restriction to our model does
not alter the estimation results in any systematic way.
29See Dickey and Fuller (1979). The number of lags used to calculate the Newey-West estimate of
variance is int
[
4 (N/100)
2
9
]
, where N is the number of observations in the series.
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country UR EP BRR BD UD ∆UD CO TW D2TFP D2MS RIRL TTSFC
Australia 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0
Austria 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0
Belgium 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1
Canada 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0
Denmark 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0
Finland 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0
France 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0
Germany 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0
Ireland 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0
Italy 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0
Japan 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0
Netherlands 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0
Norway 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0
New Zealand 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0
Portugal 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0
Spain 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0
Sweden 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0
Switzerland 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0
UK 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0
US 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0
1={H0 : unit root}not rejected at 5% level
Table 5: Unit roots in country time series
Fisher (1932). This test combines the results of N by country unit roots tests of any
kind, each with P-value Pi , in the statistic −2
∑
logPi , shown to be χ
2 distributed with
2N degrees of freedom. It relies on the assumption of no cross country correlation and
whenever this assumption is not met Maddala and Wu suggest bootstrapping to deﬁne
the critical values. In our model we control for cross country correlation by means of time
dummies, and therefore we assume to be free to use the exact distribution of the test for
inference.
Table 6 shows two versions of the cointegration test, using respectively Dickey Fuller
with trend and Phillips Perron30 as by country tests. The P-values are MacKinnon
approximations. The null hypothesis of no cointegration is rejected in both cases.
6.7 Endogeneity Tests
The labour cost equation could be aﬀected by the potential endogeneity of labour mar-
ket institutions and unemployment. As regards the unemployment rate, we expect the
endogeneity bias, if present, to be of a conservative kind, as the causal directions from
unemployment to wages and vice versa are in opposite direction. For what concerns in-
stitutions, we test the endogeneity hypothesis by means of the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test
(DWH). This augmented regression test examines whether the endogeneity of some of
30See Dickey and Fuller (1979) and Phillips and Perron (1988).
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Baseline model
Fisher panel statistic of
Dickey Fuller test (w.t.)
χ2(40) = 96.31
P-value0.000
Fisher panel statistic of
Phillips Perron test
χ2(40) = 99.75
P-value0.000
Table 6: Tests for cointegration in panel regression
the regressors causes the OLS estimator to be inconsistent, suggesting the adoption of
instrumental variables31.
There are various ways of calculating the DWH test, the simplest being the estimation
of a set of artiﬁcial regressions in which each candidate endogenous variable is regressed
upon the vector of all instruments and exogenous variables. As a second stage the residuals
of each artiﬁcial regression are included in the original model and their joint signiﬁcance
tested. The intuition behind this methodology is that if the original speciﬁcation is
correct, then the additional regressors are redundant. The tests are performed using a set
of political variables provided by the Comparative Welfare State Dataset32 as instruments
for institutions. These are: the percentage of total votes for left, center and right parties
in each country; the percentage of left, center and right seats in parliament; the left, center
and right seats as a percentage of seats held by all government parties; the cumulative
score of left, center and right parties from 1946 to the year of the observation. Table
7 presents the results for the DWH tests using the percentage of left and right seats in
parliament as instruments. Each column reports the tests for each single variable. In all
cases the null hypothesis of independence between institutions and the stochastic error is
not rejected. The same DWH tests were carried on using other combination of political
variables as instruments with similar results.
Although these results give us some conﬁdence in the interpretation of our empirical
model, the question of the endogeneity of labour market institutions is still open and will
need further investigation in the future. It is reasonable to assume that the evolution of
labour market institutions in OECD countries has been inﬂuenced by the status of the
labour market in each country. However, the identiﬁcation of the way institutional change
has been shaped is not obvious. The characteristics of the political deliberation process in
each country seem to suggest that the causal nexus is profoundly shaped by other factors
such as the voters’ preference structure, the policy makers’ agenda, the existence of stable
political equilibria and the timing of elections, among the others.
31See Hausman (1978) and the discussion in MacKinnon (1992). Note that the object of the test is
not the endogeneity of some regressors but the eﬀect of endogeneity, if present, on the estimates of the
parameters of interest.
32The Comparative Welfare State Dataset is assembled by Huber E., Ragin C., Stephens J. at University
of North Carolina and Northwestern University. The dataset contains data on socio political variables
collected for all countries in the sample, except Portugal and Spain, from 1960 to 1994. The results about
each country elections votes are classiﬁed according to the political inspiration of each party involved.
The parties are divided into three main groups: left, center and right parties.
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BR EP ∆UD CO TW
DWH test F(1,443) = .09
P-value0.76
F(1,443) = 0.19
P-value0.76
F(1,443) = 0.07
P-value0.79
F(1,443) = 0.22
P-value0.64
F(1,443) = 0.18
P-value0.67
Table 7: Durbin - Wu - Hausman tests
7 Estimation Results
We present a set of alternative speciﬁcations of the labour cost model. These are:
1. the baseline model;
2. including ∆TW ;
3. including TWt−1 and ∆TWt−1, to check for a lagged eﬀect of the tax wedge;
4. including Union Density, also interacted with unemployment rate and productivity;
5. including Oswald’s Home Ownership variable (Portugal excluded) which represents
the proportion of owner occupier households and is a proxy for labour mobility;
6. excluding Portugal for comparison with the previous model;
7. wage equation (i.e. replacing unemployment with its log in the level, delta and
interactions eﬀects);
8. including a structural break in the productivity trend;
9. including further shocks;
10. using an alternative measure of bargaining coordination;
11. including coordination types dummies;
12. check 1 of Daveri and Tabellini result, dividing the countries into three groups
according to their degree of bargaining coordination;
13. check 2 of Daveri and Tabellini result, dividing the countries into three groups
according to their degree of bargaining centralization;
14. estimation on a subsample from 1970;
15. with log unemployment and unemployment growth rate;
16. with log unemployment and unemployment growth rate also interacted with coor-
dination;
17. the static model;
18. the baseline model estimated by OLS.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
LABC LABC LABC LABC LABC LABC LABC LABC LABC
LABC(-1) 0.697 0.696 0.711 0.707 0.687 0.696 0.708 0.694 0.688
[30.29] [29.98] [29.87] [31.71] [29.12] [30.10] [29.65] [29.76] [29.29]
U -0.499 -0.476 -0.430 -0.505 -0.474 -0.495 -0.015 -0.488 -0.527
[7.12] [6.70] [6.09] [7.37] [6.77] [7.08] [4.38] [6.98] [7.44]
EP 0.023 0.024 0.023 0.020 0.018 0.024 0.026 0.024 0.020
[4.77] [5.02] [4.66] [3.89] [3.40] [4.87] [5.10] [4.85] [3.79]
BRR 0.037 0.041 0.039 0.028 0.037 0.035 0.038 0.035 0.044
[3.07] [3.40] [3.05] [2.26] [2.98] [2.84] [2.90] [2.90] [3.55]
TW 0.116 0.090 0.071 0.107 0.107 0.108 0.087 0.115 0.101
[3.90] [2.71] [1.90] [3.63] [3.61] [3.59] [2.87] [3.83] [3.42]
CO -0.026 -0.025 -0.026 -0.023 -0.024 -0.026 -0.045 -0.027 -0.029
[2.57] [2.45] [2.47] [2.17] [2.32] [2.54] [4.51] [2.63] [2.75]
∆UD 0.202 0.222 0.158 0.225 0.176 0.185 0.182 0.202 0.142
[2.73] [2.97] [2.11] [3.03] [2.33] [2.46] [2.36] [2.72] [1.92]
URCO -0.193 -0.199 -0.157 -0.241 -0.197 -0.195 0.004 -0.186 -0.174
[2.68] [2.79] [2.17] [3.21] [2.74] [2.72] [1.29] [2.59] [2.33]
URBRR 0.441 0.392 0.271 0.482 0.346 0.414 0.010 0.411 0.337
[2.08] [1.81] [1.25] [2.22] [1.67] [1.96] [1.01] [1.93] [1.61]
URUD 0.405 0.374 0.327 0.410 0.466 0.428 0.001 0.390 0.391
[2.08] [1.88] [1.67] [2.02] [2.50] [2.28] [0.05] [2.01] [2.09]
TWCO -0.141 -0.148 -0.094 -0.141 -0.127 -0.141 -0.103 -0.133 -0.147
[4.32] [4.60] [2.57] [4.41] [3.91] [4.31] [3.11] [4.10] [4.54]
π 0.471 0.469 0.444 0.445 0.503 0.467 0.441 0.468 0.505
[12.64] [12.28] [11.57] [12.41] [12.06] [12.53] [11.63] [12.60] [11.62]
D2TFP -0.381 -0.401 -0.429 -0.359 -0.434 -0.401 -0.442 -0.399 -0.414
[3.95] [4.17] [4.41] [3.74] [4.47] [4.10] [4.38] [4.14] [4.25]
TTS 0.364 0.381 0.311 0.287 0.372 0.368 0.330 0.365 0.307
[6.90] [7.21] [5.91] [6.11] [7.09] [6.99] [5.87] [6.92] [5.69]
∆TW 0.093 -0.067
[1.72] [1.25]
π·UD 0.076
[4.64]
Constant 2.718 0.948 1.026 -0.608 1.247 -0.105 0.717 -0.438 4.565
[0.44] [0.15] [0.61] [0.37] [0.69] [0.06] [0.41] [0.25] [1.64]
D2MS -0.006
[0.73]
RIRL 0.130
[3.72]
π·d70 -0.002
[1.01]
HOUSE 0.140
[1.80]
UD 0.003
[0.11]
Obs 572 570 569 572 553 553 561 572 559
Countries 20 20 20 20 19 19 20 20 20
av. T 29.58 29.55 29.48 29.58 29.95 29.95 29.12 29.58 29.09
Pval Cf=0
Pval f.e.=0
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
LABC is log real labour cost per employee, i.e. real unit wages, salaries and social security contributions paid by resident producers.
NOTES: Generalised least squares allowing for heteroskedastic errors and country specific first order serial correlation. Each equation
contains country dummies, time dummies and country specific trends. (i) When interactions are included, the variables are set as
deviations from the mean, so the interactions take the value zero at the sample mean. (ii) The variables unemployment (U), union
density (UD), benefit replacement ratio (BRR), employment tax rate (TW), owner occupation (HOUSE) are proportions (range 0-1).
Employment protection (EP) and co-ordination (CO) are indices (ranges 0-1.1, 0-2, 1-3 respectively). (iii) π is the productivity trend,
D2TFP is the acceleration in TFP, TTS is the terms of trade shock, D2MS is acceleration in money supply, RIRL the real interest rate.
z statistics in brackets.
Table 8: OECD Labour Cost Models: 1960-1994
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(10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18)
LABC LABC LABC LABC LABC LABC LABC LABC LABC
LABC(-1) 0.726 0.682 0.691 0.700 0.688 0.705 0.700 0.659
[32.79] [29.37] [28.67] [29.64] [23.53] [29.88] [29.16] [19.94]
U -0.519 -0.536 -0.352 -0.414 -0.220 -0.455 -0.439 -0.772 -0.534
[7.17] [7.50] [5.09] [5.96] [2.87] [6.59] [6.32] [6.70] [5.00]
EP 0.024 0.022 0.018 0.018 -0.004 0.025 0.027 0.037 0.003
[4.80] [4.53] [3.75] [3.74] [0.45] [5.56] [6.57] [4.36] [0.29]
BRR 0.040 0.042 0.029 0.036 0.058 0.033 0.034 0.084 0.010
[3.27] [3.43] [2.23] [2.91] [4.04] [2.71] [2.80] [4.57] [0.55]
TW 0.059 0.119 0.095 0.103 0.105 0.322 0.065
[2.07] [3.92] [2.98] [3.40] [3.46] [6.78] [1.46]
CO -0.004 -0.027 -0.032 -0.026 -0.025 -0.028 -0.034 -0.141 -0.007
[1.01] [2.53] [2.79] [2.42] [2.35] [2.81] [3.38] [8.70] [0.43]
∆UD 0.132 0.243 0.218 0.205 0.271 0.236 0.242 0.341 0.272
[1.80] [3.30] [2.90] [2.73] [3.13] [3.14] [3.24] [2.68] [2.97]
URCO -0.207 -0.193 -0.139 -0.132 -0.099 -0.157 -0.105 -0.110 -0.393
[3.34] [2.61] [1.89] [1.79] [1.44] [2.39] [1.71] [0.86] [2.75]
URBRR 0.601 0.421 0.087 0.304 -0.337 0.339 0.347 0.750 0.261
[2.68] [1.98] [0.39] [1.39] [1.44] [1.61] [1.62] [2.40] [0.88]
URUD 0.400 0.349 0.349 0.281 0.103 0.359 0.322 0.751 0.059
[2.11] [1.82] [1.80] [1.44] [0.48] [1.85] [1.63] [2.91] [0.24]
TWCO -0.136 -0.139 -0.089 -0.133 -0.132 -0.152 -0.071
[4.05] [4.13] [2.46] [4.01] [3.93] [2.57] [1.28]
π 0.423 0.489 0.454 0.438 0.465 0.457 0.468 1.393 0.489
[11.51] [12.95] [12.17] [11.83] [6.44] [12.02] [11.80] [35.40] [8.52]
D2TFP -0.420 -0.392 -0.439 -0.404 -0.379 -0.337 -0.345 -0.608 -0.328
[4.33] [4.08] [4.55] [4.22] [3.58] [3.49] [3.57] [3.75] [2.90]
TTS 0.359 0.331 0.330 0.318 0.340 0.336 0.332 0.741 0.296
[6.57] [6.22] [6.24] [6.05] [6.17] [6.32] [6.24] [7.80] [4.39]
γˆUR -0.007 -0.000 0.006
[2.09] [0.09] [1.05]
Constant -0.934 -0.335 0.492 -0.503 5.529 0.277 0.439 -3.329 -1.893
[0.56] [0.20] [0.30] [0.30] [1.80] [0.17] [0.27] [1.10] [0.92]
γˆUR·CO -0.012
[2.62]
TW·Gunc 0.077 0.086
[2.23] [2.52]
TW·Gint 0.105 0.094
[3.41] [2.91]
TW·Gcoo 0.079 0.051
[2.67] [1.54]
COT1 -0.022
[2.87]
COT2 0.002
[0.37]
COT4 0.009
[1.46]
COT5 0.017
[2.33]
COT6 0.002
[0.42]
Obs 572 572 572 572 470 572 572 572 572
Countries 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20
av. T 29.58 29.58 29.58 29.58 24.02 29.58 29.58 29.58 29.58
Pval Cf=0
Pval f.e.=0
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
LABC is log real labour cost per employee, i.e. real unit wages, salaries and social security contributions paid by resident producers.
NOTES: Generalised least squares allowing for heteroskedastic errors and country specific first order serial correlation, OLS in 18. Each
equation contains country dummies, time dummies and country specific trends. (i) When interactions are included, the variables are set
as deviations from the mean, so the interactions take the value zero at the sample mean. (ii) The variables unemployment (U), union
density (UD), benefit replacement ratio (BRR), employment tax rate (TW) are proportions (range 0-1). Employment protection (EP)
and coordination (CO) are indices (ranges 0-1.1, 0-2, 1-3 respectively). (iii) π is the productivity trend, D2TFP is the acceleration in TFP,
TTS is the terms of trade shock, γˆUR is the rate of growth of unemployment, COT1-COT6 are coordination type dummies. TW·Gunc,
TW·Gint and TW·Gcoo are interactions between TW and dummies for, respectively, uncoordinated (decentralized), intermediate and
coordinated countries in model 12, decentralized, intermediate and centralized countries in model 13. z statistics in brackets.
Table 9: OECD Labour Cost Models: 1960-1994 (continued)
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The estimation output is presented in Tables 8 and 9. All models are estimated
using a ﬁxed eﬀect GLS estimator, corrected for by country heteroskedasticity and serial
correlation, except for Model 18 that is estimated by OLS.
The unemployment coeﬃcient is negative and signiﬁcant in all speciﬁcations. This
conﬁrms the theoretical scenario depicted in section 2, showing that the labour market
adjustment mechanism is at work. Model 1, our benchmark speciﬁcation, shows also
that the impact of unemployment on wages is shaped by the labour market institutional
conﬁguration. The negative wage adjustment triggered by an increase in unemployment
is reinforced by higher bargaining coordination, weaker union density and lower unem-
ployment beneﬁts. For what concerns the change in unemployment, we could not ﬁnd
any signiﬁcance eﬀect.
As regards the level impact of wage pressure institutions, we ﬁnd a positive signiﬁcant
impact of employment protection, beneﬁt replacement rates, the tax wedge and of an
increase in union density. The beneﬁt duration indicator is instead never signiﬁcant.
Coordination has a negative eﬀect on wages, both in level and through the interactions
with the tax wedge and unemployment. This result is some way in line with the previous
ﬁndings of Alesina and Perotti (1997) and Daveri and Tabellini (2000) according to which
in presence of high bargaining coordination the impact of the tax variable is reduced.
However, this speciﬁcation does not allow to test for the hump shape hypothesis suggested
by these authors. Alternative tests of the complementarity eﬀects between the labour
tax rate and coordination are therefore provided by Models 12 and 13. In the former
model the countries are divided into three groups according to their degree of bargaining
coordination, and the resulting indicator variables are interacted with taxation33. Gunc is
the dummy for the group of uncoordinated countries, characterized by a coordination level
CO < 1.5. Gint is the indicator for the intermediate countries, with 1.5 ≤ CO ≤ 2, and
Gcoo is the indicator for highly coordinated countries with CO > 2. Diﬀerently from the
analysis of the previous papers, here the countries do not belong necessarily to one group
for the whole sample period, but they transfer from one group to another according to the
institutional changes occurred from the 1960s to the 1990s. The hump shape hypothesis is
only partially conﬁrmed by our analysis. In fact, although the coeﬃcient of intermediate
countries is the largest, the tax variable has a positive signiﬁcant impact on all groups of
countries and not on the intermediate group only. In addition, although we cannot reject
the hypothesis that the three coeﬃcients diﬀer across the three country groups, the long
term impact of taxation on labour cost is very similar. For example, a 10 percentage
points rise in tax induces a 2.5 percent increase in labour cost in the not coordinated and
coordinated countries and a 3.2 percent increase in the intermediate countries.
The test provided by Model 12 is not strictly comparable with the one presented by
Alesina and Perotti since they classify the countries according to the degree of central-
ization in wage bargaining and not of coordination34. In order to allow for comparisons
Model 13 performs the same test using a time varying centralization indicator for the con-
33The results below depend only marginally on the deﬁnition of coordinated, intermediate and unco-
ordinated countries, i.e. on the thresholds we use to construct the group dummies. The criteria reported
here are the most sensible in order to have enough observations in each group. However, if we adopt
alternative reasonable thresholds’ values we obtain almost identical coeﬃcients and conﬁdence intervals.
34These two variables are positively correlated and have a comparable mean and standard deviation
over the sample. Coordination is however more general than centralization, as the latter simply refers to
the level at which wages are bargained (plant, ﬁrm, industry or economy-wide).
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struction of the three dummies. The results are again only moderately in line with the
hump shape hypothesis. The impact of the tax variable is not signiﬁcant in centralized
countries only while in decentralized and intermediate countries wages are signiﬁcantly
aﬀected by employment taxation. In this case a 10 percentage points rise in tax induces
a 3 percent increase in labour cost in the decentralized and intermediate country groups.
As expected, the productivity trend has a large positive impact on wages. The long
run coeﬃcient is greater than one, suggesting that the long run elasticity of substitution
between capital and labour is lower than one35. The eﬀect is reinforced if unions are
stronger, as in Model 436.
The TFP and the terms of trade shocks have a signiﬁcant impact on wages, respec-
tively of negative and positive sign, as expected. This means that labour cost fails to
accommodate an acceleration of total factor productivity above the trend while an ad-
verse shock in relative import prices induce workers to maintain their real net incomes,
increasing wage pressure. The TFP and the real wage resistance eﬀect are robust to the
introduction of another set of shocks, namely the real interest rate and the acceleration
in money supply, as in Model 9. The coeﬃcient of the latter variable is not signiﬁcant,
while the interest rate coeﬃcient is signiﬁcant with positive sign. This ﬁnding may be
interpreted as a corroboration of the hypothesis suggested above of a positive relation
between real interest rate and non human wealth of the unemployed.
In Model 10 we substitute the coordination variable with the measure provided by
Nickell et al. (2001) that tries to capture the various detailed nuances of the variations in
coordination. In this speciﬁcation the coordination variable is not signiﬁcant in level, but
still has a signiﬁcant eﬀect in reinforcing the unemployment wage adjustment mechanism
and in reducing the wage pressure impact of the tax variable.
Model 15 includes the unemployment growth rate among the explanatory variables. Its
signiﬁcance with expected sign reinforces the importance of the labour market adjustment
mechanism. Moreover, Model 16 shows that the impact of unemployment growth is
strengthened when wage bargaining is coordinated, although the change in unemployment
becomes insigniﬁcant in levels37.
Model 11 incorporates a set of dummies that account for changes in types of coordi-
nation, based on a taxonomy due to Traxler (1996) and Traxler and Kittel (2000). We
include ﬁve of the six categorical variables originally set by these authors38. These are:
CO1=inter associational coordination, i.e. coordination by the major confederations
of employers and labour;
35In analytical terms, we can rewrite a general proﬁt maximizing condition AF1
(
AN
K
, 1
)
= W
Pκ
where
N is labour, K is capital, W is the labour cost per employee, P is the GDP deﬂator in aggregate and
κ = (1− 1/η) where η is the output demand elasticity. Being F1 homogeneous of degree zero in its two
arguments, after eliminating K we obtain N = Y
A
h
(
W
APκ
)
, with h′ < 0. Assuming κ constant, this can
be written in log linear form as (w − p) = α0 +
1
σ
(y − n) +
β
2
σ
a, where σ is the long run elasticity of
substitution. Our estimates imply that σ < 1. This means that if wages grow faster then productivity,
the labour share increases.
36This result is in line with previous ﬁndings in the literature. For example, Booth et al. (1999) identify
a positive impact of unions on wages and productivity through greater gains from training.
37We must be however careful in interpreting these results since using unemployment in log form is
problematic, as noted at page 4.
38We exclude CO3, pattern setting coordination to avoid multicollinearity.
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CO2=intra associational coordination, i.e. within the major confederations of em-
ployers and labour;
CO4=state imposed coordination;
CO5=non-coordination;
CO6=state sponsored coordination, i.e. with the state joining the bargaining process
as an additional party.
The model conﬁrms again a signiﬁcant positive impact of an uncoordinated bargaining
framework on wages. In addition, the type of coordination that seems to be most relevant
in reducing wage pressure is the inter associational39.
Model 2 tests for the signiﬁcance of changes in taxation and Model 3 tests for lagged
eﬀects in taxation. In both cases, the variables are insigniﬁcant. Model 5 tests for
the impact of the home ownership variable, suggested by Oswald as a proxy for labour
mobility40. The idea here is that if a larger share of households are house owners, then
workers will be more reluctant to migrate to diﬀerent regions in order to ﬁnd a job.
This will reduce the labour market adjustment speed in presence of local adverse shocks,
preventing one important allocation mechanism, namely labour mobility, to take place.
In our model the home ownership variable has a positive and signiﬁcant (at the 10% level)
impact on wages, suggesting that lower mobility may also have a wage pressure eﬀect,
through the rigid geographical localization of the labour force41. In Model 6 we drop the
observations from Portugal, in order to make a comparison with Model 5, since no home
ownership data is available for that country. As we can see, the model is quite stable
after we drop these observations42.
In Model 7 we substitute unemployment with its log in order to compare our ﬁndings
with the wage equation of Blanchﬂower and Oswald (1990, 1994). The long run elasticity
of wages with respect to unemployment is 5 percent, i.e. half of the one estimated by
Blanchﬂower and Oswald43. This result is not substantially diﬀerent if we estimate the
static version of the model or if we limit our sample to the period 1970-1994.
In Model 8 we test the signiﬁcance of a split trend in productivity after 1970, inter-
acting PROD with a dummy equal to 1 for all years after 1970. This is to check if we are
able to capture with a split trend in productivity the rapid growth of the share of labour
in most countries in the 1960s. The interaction is insigniﬁcant, although it is negative as
we would expect.
Finally, the labour cost equation is estimated in its static form in Model 17. This is
another implicit test of the Pesaran - Smith bias in dynamic heterogeneous panels. The
implications of the benchmark model are actually reinforced by the static model.
Overall, the empirical results are robust to diﬀerent speciﬁcations and are coherent
with the ﬁndings of the unemployment model in the companion paper Nickell et al. The
institutions and the unemployment rate have a signiﬁcant impact on OECD wages, once
we control for the productivity trend. The next step is then to establish what proportion
39The same results are obtained if we drop the coordination variable, CO, from the model.
40See Oswald (1996).
41The real impact of labour mobility may be stronger than the one estimated in Model 5, as our results
may suﬀer from the high interpolation of the home ownership variable.
42This exercize is also useful in order to control for possible ”Portugal eﬀects” due to the impact of the
Portugal revolution in the 1970s.
43This result is however in line with other studies, see for example the analysis of Galiani (1999) for
Argentina.
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of the wage dynamics from 1960 to 1994 can actually be imputed to changes in institutions
and unemployment given productivity. Next section provides some dynamic simulations
of the baseline model in order to answer to this question.
8 Dynamic Simulations
We present a summary of the results of a set of dynamic simulations performed on the
baseline version of the labour cost model. The scope of the dynamic simulations is the
measurement of the impact on wages of the evolution of labour market institutions and
unemployment from 1960 to 1994 in OECD countries.
The simulations are produced generating a labour cost series for each country through
a recursive procedure that substitute the lagged dependent variable with the previous year
prediction of the baseline model. The simulated series are then compared with the one
obtained using the same method but constraining one or more regressors at their average
1960s value. In this way we calculate the variation in labour cost that can be imputed to
the evolution of the speciﬁc regressors over the estimation period.
Obviously, the major part of the rise in wages is due to the productivity trend and
relative to this institutions are not important. What is important, however, are the
impacts of institutions once we control for productivity.
Figures 1 and 2 show, respectively, the contribution of the changes in institutions and
unemployment (from the 1960s average) to the changes in labour costs in the 1980s and
in the 1990s44. From the ﬁgures it emerges quite clearly that the role of unemployment is
to oﬀset the impact of institutions. In other words, given that wages cannot move too far
away from the productivity trend, unemployment has to increase in order to balance the
pressure on wages induced by institutions. It follows that the change in unemployment
tends to be bigger when the institutional eﬀects are bigger in the opposite direction.
Although the role played by each institution varies across countries and time, we see
that, on average, the major labour cost changes are generated by the beneﬁt replacement
ratio, taxation and employment protection. Indeed, the simulations display a signiﬁcant
institutional impact in countries that were characterized by a noticeable variation in in-
stitutions over the sample period. For example, employment protection regulations do
not play any role in countries, such as the non-European and Switzerland, where these
regulations did not change substantially from the 1960s. On the other hand, stricter em-
ployment protection regulations triggered a wage rise in countries like Portugal, Sweden,
Germany and France.
Higher beneﬁt replacement ratios have increased wages in most of the countries in the
sample. On the contrary, the fall in the UK ratios had instead a negative impact in that
country.
For what concerns coordination, the simulations do not show any eﬀect for the group of
countries in which coordination remained stable over the period. However, the increase in
coordination in the 1990s was particularly relevant in moderating labour costs in Ireland,
France and Italy.
44Note that, in order to make the simulation ﬁgures more informative, they show the predicted per-
centage change in actual real labour cost, and not in the series in logs.
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Figure 1: Dynamic simulations with regressors ﬁxed at 1960s average values: percentage
changes in labour cost in the 1980s imputed to speciﬁc institutional dimensions
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Figure 2: Dynamic simulations with regressors ﬁxed at 1960s average values: percentage
changes in labour cost in the 1990s imputed to speciﬁc institutional dimensions
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9 Concluding Remarks
This paper presents an empirical investigation of the determinants of labour cost in 20
OECD countries observed from 1960 to 1994. The regressions are estimated using a ﬁxed
eﬀects estimator in GLS form, correcting for heteroskedasticity and residual serial correla-
tion. We include year dummies in order to control for contemporaneous correlations and
we test for panel cointegration, endogeneity and poolability issues among other things.
The main ﬁndings of the paper are the following:
• The unemployment rate has a negative and signiﬁcant impact on labour cost. Au-
tonomous shocks on unemployment can therefore be oﬀset by labour market forces
since higher unemployment triggers a reduction in wages. The estimated long run
elasticity of wages with respect to unemployment is 5 percent, i.e. half the one
estimated by Blanchﬂower and Oswald (1990, 1994).
• Labour market institutions have a signiﬁcant impact on wages. The impact can be
either direct, inducing wage pressure despite excess supply in the labour market,
or indirect, inﬂuencing the matching process of unemployed individuals to available
job vacancies.
• The eﬀect of institutions is coherent with the results of the unemployment model
estimated in the companion paper Nickell et al. (2001). These ﬁndings conﬁrm
the theoretical scenario depicted in the ﬁrst part of the paper where equilibrium
unemployment is determined by autonomous wage pressure institutions.
• The productivity trend plays a major role in the evolution of wages in OECD coun-
tries in the last decades. The employees’ productivity gains seem to be higher if
unions are stronger. The model does not conﬁrm a structural break in the produc-
tivity coeﬃcient after the 1970s.
• Taxation has a positive impact on labour cost. The model conﬁrms therefore the
existence of a shift eﬀect from employees to ﬁrms, although smaller than the one
estimated by previous papers. The tax eﬀect is moderated by high coordination
in wage bargaining. The Daveri and Tabellini hypothesis of major impact of the
tax wedge in countries with intermediate degree of coordination is only partially
conﬁrmed by our analysis. In fact, the tax wedge is signiﬁcant in uncoordinated,
intermediate as well as coordinated countries, and the impact of taxes seems only
to be vaguely hump shaped.
• The institutions governing the bargaining process play a major role in shaping
wages, both directly as well as through their interaction with unemployment and
taxation. Bargaining coordination has a direct negative eﬀect on labour costs, and
an indirect eﬀect in reducing the positive impact of taxation and increasing the
negative impact of unemployment.
• Stronger unions increase wages, although their adverse eﬀect can be oﬀset by high
coordination in wage bargaining.
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• Higher beneﬁt replacement rates have a signiﬁcant and positive eﬀect on labour
cost. They increase workers’ utility in case of the unemployment fall back position
raising the average reservation wage. In addition, they reduce the eﬀect of labour
market adjustment forces induced by higher unemployment.
• The impact of beneﬁt duration is insigniﬁcant in all model speciﬁcations.
• Employment protection has a positive impact on wages, possibly through the in-
crease in the insiders’ rent positions.
• Macroeconomic shocks have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on wages. In particular, the term of
trade shock has a positive eﬀect while the acceleration in TFP growth has a negative
impact, showing a certain degree of real wage resistance in OECD economies.
• The home ownership variable, proposed by Oswald as a proxy for low labour mobil-
ity has a positive impact on wages. This suggests that if mobility rates are reduced,
wages are likely to rise in order to accommodate local labour demand pressure.
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Data Appendix
A Countries and Time Period
The data contain information about the evolution of labour market institutions in twenty
OECD countries from 1960 to 1994.
The countries in the sample are:
Australia Finland Japan Spain
Austria France Netherlands Sweden
Belgium Germany Norway Switzerland
Canada Ireland New Zealand United Kingdom
Denmark Italy Portugal United States
Where possible, the data refer to West Germany throughout.
B Definitions and Sources
B.1 Labour Market Institutions
EP: Employment Protection
Blanchard and Wolfers (2000) provide an employment protection time varying variable
from 1960 to 1995, each observation taken every 5 years. This series was built chaining
OECD data with data from Lazear (1990). Notice that the OECD data, used from
1985 onward, is constructed on the basis of a more extensive collection of employment
protection dimensions, compared with data used by Lazear. This dataset includes an
interpolation of the Blanchard and Wolfers series, readjusted in mean. Range is {0,2}
increasing with strictness of employment protection.
UDNET: Net Union Density
For non-European countries this variable is constructed as the ratio of Total Reported
Union Members (gross minus retired and unemployed members), from Visser (1996),
to Wage and Salaried Employees, from Huber et al. (1997). The data are updated
respectively from Bureau of Labor Statistics (United States: 1994 and 1995), from ILO
(1997)[27] (Australia: 1995; New Zealand: 1994 and 1995; Canada: 1994 and 1995) and
from the Basic Survey on Labour Unions by the Japan Ministry of Health, Labour and
Welfare (Japan: 1995).
The data for European countries except Sweden are produced by Ebbinghaus and
Visser (2000) using the same criteria. For what concerns Sweden, Ebbinghaus and Visser
provide data on gross density only. Therefore we use the same sources we use for non-
European countries, updating the series using the growth rate of gross density in 1995.
Note that:
29
1. From 1991 onward the density data refers to uniﬁed Germany. To make the series
consistent it was chained with the data provided by OECD and Bain and Price
(1980);
2. New Zealand data on salary and wage earners is not available for 1962-1978 and
1982-1985 periods, so Net Union Density was calculated using Total Civilian Em-
ployment as denominator from the same dataset. In addition, an interpolation was
used for missing New Zealand data in 1987-1988.
3. The data from Ebbinghaus and Visser do not include information for Portugal over
the whole period and for Spain before 1982. An interpolation of OECD values was
used for these observations, chaining the data when necessary.
CO: Bargaining Coordination 1
This is an index with range {1, 3} constructed as an interpolation of OECD data on
bargaining coordination. It is increasing in the degree of coordination in the bargaining
process on the employers’ as well as on the unions’ side. The resulting series were matched
with the data provided by Belot and Van Ours (2000).
COW: Bargaining Coordination 2
Nickell et al. (2001) provide a coordination series constructed using similar criteria
as above, but containing short term variation in coordination. Based on data reported
in OECD Employment Outlook (1994) (1997), Traxler and Kittel (2000), Wallerstein
(1999), Windmuller et al. (1987), Bamber and Lansbury (1998). For full details, see
Ochel (2000).
COIT1-COIT6: Coordination Types
Dummy variables accounting for types of coordination based on a taxonomy due to
Traxler (1996), Traxler and Kittel (2000).
Adopting Traxler taxonomy we have:
COIT1=inter associational coordination;
COIT2=intra associational coordination;
COIT3=pattern setting;
COIT4=state imposed coordination;
COIT5=uncoordinated;
COIT6=state sponsored coordination.
BRR: Benefit Replacement Ratios
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Beneﬁt Replacement Ratios data is provided by OECD with one observation every
two years for each country in the sample. The data refers to ﬁrst year of unemployment
beneﬁts, averaged over family types of recipients, since in many countries beneﬁts are
distributed according to family composition. The beneﬁts are a proportion of average
earnings before tax.
BD: Benefit Durations
An index was constructed by the authors as a weighted average equal to:
BD = αBRR2
BRR
1
+ (1− α)BRR4
BRR
1
where: BRR1 is the unemployment beneﬁt replacement rate received during the ﬁrst
year of unemployment, BRR2 is the replacement rate received during the second and third
year of unemployment and BRR4 is the replacement rate received during the fourth and
ﬁfth year of unemployment. Note that we give more weight to the ﬁrst ratio than to
the second (α = 0.6). If beneﬁt provision stops after one year (min duration), then
BRR2 = BRR4 = 0, and BDAV = 0. If however beneﬁt provision is constant over the
unemployment years, we have BRR2 = BRR4 = BRR1, with BDAV = 1.
TW: Tax Wedge
The tax wedge is equal to the sum of the employment tax rate, the direct tax rate
and the indirect tax rate:
TW = t1 + t2 + t3 .
The employment tax rate t1 is calculated as
t1 =
EC
(IE −EC)
with EC equal to employers’ total contributions and IE equal to wages, salaries and
social security contributions.
The direct tax rate t2 is equal to
t2t =
DTt
HCRt
whereDT is the amount of direct taxes andHCR is the amount of households’ current
receipts.
The indirect tax rate is
t3t =
TXt − SBt
CCt
with TX being total indirect taxes, SB subsidies, and CC private ﬁnal expenditures.
All data come from London School of Economics CEP - OECD database, updated
by authors using the same criteria. Generally, the data are taken from OECD National
Accounts.
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HO: Housing (proportion owner occupied)
The data about owner occupier households, as percentage of total households, is pro-
vided by Oswald (1996). This data was recently updated by Oswald, so that the 1990
ﬁgure for Spain is 78% not 75%, and the 1960 ﬁgure is 51% not 52%, and the 1990 ﬁgure
for Ireland is 78% not 81%. Oswald data contain information about 19 countries (Por-
tugal excluded) over 4 periods (1960, 1970, 1980 and 1990). This dataset contains an
interpolation of Oswald’s data.
B.2 Macroeconomic Variables
UR: Unemployment Rate
Standardized unemployment rate from Layard et al. (1991), updated by authors
using the same criteria (see OECD Employment Outlook, 2000, Table A). The missing
observations for Portugal are from CEP - OECD database. Data for Italy are based on
the US Bureau of Labor Statistics, ”unemployment rates on US concepts”.
LABC: Labour Cost
Labour cost is deﬁned as
w − p = log (IE)− log (ET )− log (PGDP )
where IE are compensations of employees by resident producers, namely wages, salaries
and social security contributions, ET is total employment and PGDP is GDP deﬂator
at factor cost. All data is from CEP - OECD database, updated by authors using the
same criteria, except for PGDP that is calculated from GDP at factor cost, current and
constant prices, from OECD Business Sector Database.
EPOP: Employment Population Ratio
Total civilian employment normalised on the working age population (15-64), from
CEP OECD data, updated by authors.
RIRL: Real Interest Rate
Long term real interest rate, constructed using long term nominal interest rate and
inﬂation from OECD Economic Outlook Database.
PRODHP: Trend Productivity
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The labour productivity measure, π in the paper, was calculated as an Hodrick
Prescott trend of log real GDP minus log of total employment, i.e.
PRODHP = HPtrend {log (Y Q)− log (ET )}
where ET is total employment, and Y Q is real GDP at 1990 prices.
D2MS: Acceleration in Money Supply
This is equal to ∆2 ln (MS), where MS is money supply from OECD Economic Out-
look Database.
LDS: Labour Demand Shock
This series consists of the residuals εˆt of the following 20 by country regressions:
log (ETt) = β0+β1 log (ETt−1)+β2 log (ETt−2)+β3 log (ETt−3)+β4 log (Y Qt)+β5 log (WTPt)+εt
where ET is total employment and Y Q and WTP are respectively real GDP and real
labour cost at 1990 prices.
TTS: Terms of Trade Shock
This series is equal to
IMP =
MC
Y C
∆
{
log
(
Pm
PG
)}
where MC are imports at current prices, Y C is GDP at current prices, Pm is import
price deﬂator and PG is GDP deﬂator at market prices, both with 1990 as base year. The
dataset contains also a factor cost version of the shock (TTSFC), calculated using the
series on GDP deﬂator at factor cost.
D2TFP: acceleration in TFP
This series is calculated as a three years moving average of ∆2TFP , where TFP is
the series from Nickell and Nunziata (2000). This is based on the Solow residual for each
country.
TFPHPC: HP cyclical component of TFP
This series consists of the Hodrick Prescott cyclical component of the Solow residual,
TFPCY = Solow residual - HP trend .
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